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Abstract 
This report explores the Greenlandic government’s recent strategies to 
establish large-scale extractive industries in its territory, focusing especially on 
Greenland’s developing ties to the EU, China and South Korea. The report 
links the Greenlandic government’s international outreach to the territory’s 
aspirations for full independence from Denmark, showing how mounting 
international interest in Arctic resources serves to strengthen the idea of 
Greenland as a independent actor. The aim of this report is to highlight how 
the creation of a sovereign image is at the centre of statebuilding efforts in 
Greenland, and how, by taking advantage of the mounting global interest in 
the Arctic, Greenland is able to effectively increase its international agency. 
This report takes a constructivist approach to soveireignty, and the work of 
Cynthia Weber and Thomas Biersteker forms its theoretical core. 
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1 Introduction  
This report explores the recent approach of the Greenlandic government 
toward the development of natural resources in its territory, and argues 
that Nuuk’s emphasis on attracting foreign capital to Greenland’s 
extractive industries is intimately linked with the aspiration of inde-
pendence from Denmark. By increasingly conducting its own foreign 
affairs, Greenland’s government is circumventing Copenhagen and 
building up independent ties to the world outside the Danish Realm. 
These new relationships hold the potential to spark a resource adventure 
which may bring about a new Arctic state – a state the size of Great 
Britain, Spain, France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Austria and Switzerland 
combined, and with the world’s lowest population density.1 
This report claims that the very potential for large-scale resource 
extraction is fundamental to state-building in Greenland, a self-governed 
territory with only 56,000 inhabitants. By enabling the island’s 
development of independent foreign relations, the anticipation of 
Greenland as a treasure chest of hydrocarbons and minerals is reshaping 
the status of this vast territory, creating a larger space for Nuuk’s 
manoeuvring in the sphere of international politics. This report argues 
that the Greenlandic government’s effective projection of sovereignty, 
together with the rising international interest in Arctic resources, has 
allowed Greenland to emerge as an important economic and political ally 
in the High North, despite the lack of formal statehood.  
As widely recognized in the spheres of Danish and Greenlandic politics, 
the key to Greenland's future sovereignty lies in its ability to secure a 
sustainable revenue to replace the crucial Danish subsidies, which today 
make up 60 per cent of the national budget. Thus, there is a strong 
pragmatic basis to Greenland’s resource strategy and foreign policy: if 
the country does not succeed in raising foreign capital to launch its 
extractive industries, independence from Denmark will remain an 
impossibility.  
Digging deeper, one also discovers a more complex political reality at 
play in Greenland, one which calls for a an analysis that goes beyond 
simplified rationalist perspectives. Nuuk’s statebuilding strategy not only 
seeks to secure new sources of revenue, but to project and practice 
sovereignty through the government’s resource diplomacy. Here, con-
structivist theorists like Cynthia Weber and Thomas Biersteker offer 
valuable insights to the nature of sovereignty as a socially constructed 
notion. Building on the constructivist observation that sovereignty is not a 
definitive either-or concept, but a construct subject to evolving practices 
and discourses, this report illustrates how sovereignty is being 
strategically constituted and developed by Greenland’s government in 
                                                     
1 From the press room of Greenland’s official tourist site: 
<http://www.greenland.com/en/corporate/press-room/press-info-on-greenland/facts-
about-greenland.aspx>  
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order to increase its agency in international affairs, and to pave the way 
for final formal statehood.  
By investigating Greenland’s policies of rapid modernisation and 
industrialisation against the backdrop of current Arctic geopolitics, I aim 
to demonstrate that Greenland is taking advantage of the growing 
international interest in the Arctic in order to strengthen its position in the 
international system, and to reiterate its aspirations of full sovereignty.  
Greenland’s ambition of future independence is projected both toward 
Copenhagen, in order to impact the governance structures of the Danish 
Realm, as well as internationally, for the purpose of strengthening the 
perception of Greenland as an autonomous player. This report 
emphasizes how Greenland effectively projects sovereignty through its 
dealings with states and state-based organizations outside the Danish 
Realm. The report looks specifically at the resource diplomacy playing 
out between Greenland and the EU, China and South Korea, with the 
latter two representing the main cases of Greenland’s emerging 
independent foreign policy. In particular, Nuuk’s new relations to North 
East Asian states serve a double purpose in Greenland’s quest for 
independence. Chinese and South Korean capital is seen as an important 
opportunity to secure large investments from a resource-hungry part of 
the world, and thereby make possible a self-sustaining economy in 
Greenland. At the same time, building independent ties to new states is 
furthering Greenland’s personality as a sovereign actor in the inter-
national political sphere. 
This report procedes with a brief outline of Greenland’s Self Rule 
arrangement and of the government’s approach to resource extraction and 
foreign investment. It then moves on to describe the international political 
milieu in which Greenland’s development is taking place, sketching the 
territory’s current position within the framework of Arctic geopolitics. 
The report then situates its core arguments on sovereignty and state-
building within the sphere of constructivist literature, exploring legal and 
political notions of sovereignty as they relate to Greenland’s statebuilding 
strategy. Then follows an outline of the report’s methodology, before 
moving on to the empirical evidence connecting Greenland’s political 
strategies and important events with my theoretical argument. Here, 
Nuuk’s emerging relationship to China and South Korea make up the 
main cases of Greenland’s emerging foreign relations. The report also 
draws on Greenland’s resource diplomacy with the EU to illustrate the 
strengthening geopolitical position of Greenland. Finally, some 
conclusions and projections for Greenland’s future role as an independent 
Arctic player are provided. 
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2  Setting the Stage: Greenland in a Changing 
Milieu of Arctic Geopolitics 
2.1  From Colonial Rule to Self Rule, and Beyond  
Greenland has been part of the Danish Realm since the arrival of 
missionary Hans Egede in 1721. During the colonial relationship that 
followed, the interaction between Greenlanders and Danes was 
characterized by a hierarchical structure, where Greenlanders were 
expected to adopt the higher-standing Danish religion and way of life. 
Illustratively, Danes were named “naalagat,” which means “those who 
make the decisions.” Greenlanders were not granted the same rights as 
Danish citizens until 1953, when Greenland was declared an equal part of 
the Danish Realm after a constitutional revision. Importantly, this 
revision secured the reservation of two chairs in the Danish Parliament 
for representatives elected in Greenland.2   
In 1979, Greenland obtained its first Home Rule government. After 
public demands of local participation and legitimate governance, 
Denmark agreed to transfer several administrative functions to 
Greenland’s own elected government. Notably, the jurisdiction over 
subsoil resources remained in Copenhagen in order for Denmark to 
maintain control over possible future oil discoveries. 3 The Home Rule 
Act introduced what is seen as the most important practical implication 
for Greenland’s continued inclusion in the Danish Realm, namely the 
annual cash transfer from Copenhagen to Nuuk, usually referred to as the 
block grant.  
Today, the continuation of this grant is seen by many as the principal 
symbol of the dependency relation between Greenland and its former 
colonizer. The fact that 60 per cent of Greenland’s budget is financed 
through the block grant stands as a constant reminder to many 
Greenlanders that their country remains dependent on Denmark for the 
financing of basic public services.4 
With the Self Rule Act of 2009, all areas of jurisdiction over Greenlandic 
territory were transferred to Nuuk, except those of foreign affairs, 
security and the judiciary. The competence over these areas remain with 
Copenhagen. The Self Rule Act granted Greenland the right to enter into 
legally binding treaties with foreign governments on certain policy areas, 
such as climate, fisheries, and economic matters. The Act also secured 
Greenland the absolute jurisdiction over all underground resources, 
including in the country’s territorial waters.5 As this report will 
                                                     
2 Denmark’s History Records: Danmarkshistorien. Grundlovsendringen 1953. Accessed 
at <http://danmarkshistorien.dk/perioder/kold-krig-og-velfaerdsstat-1945-
1973/grundlovsaendringen-1953/> 
3 Ibid. 
4 Klaus Georg Hansen: Uavhengigheten og oljen, lecture at the conference Geopolitics in 
the High North at Greenland’s University Illisimatusarfik, Nuuk, May 5, 2013. 
5 Bureau for Inatsisartut: Inatsisartutlov nr. 26 af 18. november 2010: Lov om Inatsisartut 
og Naalakkersuisut. November 18, 2010. 
4 Lisa Linnea Erdal 
 
emphasize, the jurisdictional changes following from the Self Rule Act 
have been essential in allowing Greenland to pursue a strategy of forging 
independent ties to outside states and foreign companies.  
Another crucial part of the Self Rule Act was the freezing of the block 
grant at approximately 3.5 billion Danish kroner annually. This feature of 
the Act indicates the urgency of finding alternative income sources over 
the next few decades, as the grant is not expected to be sufficient to cover 
Greenland’s increasing public spending, especially given an aging 
population and a low-skilled labour force.6 Due to the dire situation of 
Greenland’s economy, including the decreasing profits from fisheries, 
Greenlandic politicians view large-scale extractive industries as the only 
possible way to a self-sustained economy.7  
In the advent of large extractive industries in Greenland, the Self Rule 
Act dictates a gradual decrease in the block grant from Copenhagen. The 
Act states that when Greenland’s income from resource extraction 
exceeds 75 million kroner annually, the grant will be reduced each year 
with half the amount exceeding 75 million. If in the future Greenland’s 
income becomes so substantial that the block grant is reduced to zero, the 
Self Rule Act will be renegotiated.8 It is at this point that Greenland may 
hypothetically become independent. The moment Greenland is no longer 
financially tied to Denmark, the renegotiation of the Self Rule Act will 
allow the Greenlandic population to vote over independence.  
And Greenlanders will likely vote yes: In a poll from 2003, 80 per cent of 
the respondents say they want full independence from Denmark. But if 
this independence implies a lower standard of living, a meagre four per 
cent maintain their answer in the affirmative.9 Thus, the desire for 
statehood is intimately connected with the realization that new sources of 
income must first become reality. Once financial independence is 
secured, Greenlanders’ status as a legally recognized people10 means they 
are free to break with the Realm if they so wish. Notably, Copenhagen 
has been consistent in signaling that it will not attempt to hinder future 
Greenlandic statehood.11 
                                                     
6 Naalakkersuisut Tax and Welfare Committee: Den offentlige sektor. Publication released 
March 2011. 
7 Klaus Georg Hansen: Uavhengigheten og oljen, lecture at the conference Geopolitics in 
the High North at Greenland’s University Illisimatusarfik, Nuuk, May 5, 2013. See also 
interview with Kuupik Kleist by Politiken.dk: Kleist: Undergrund kan frigøre Grønland 
fra bloktilskud. January 15, 2013. <http://politiken.dk/politik/ECE1867973/kleist-
undergrund-kan-frigoere-groenland-fra-bloktilskud/>  
8 Bureau for Inatsisartut: Inatsisartutlov nr. 26 af 18. november 2010: Lov om Inatsisartut 
og Naalakkersuisut. November 18, 2010. 
9 Krogh Andersen, Marianne: Grønland, Mektig og Avmektig. Gyldendal Forlag, 2008. 
Page 32. 
10 The Self Rule Act formally recognized Greenland’s population as a people by law. See 
Bureau for Inatsisartut: Inatsisartutlov nr. 26 af 18. november 2010: Lov om Inatsisartut 
og Naalakkersuisut. November 18, 2010. The formal recognition of Greenlanders as a 
people gives them the right to self-determination and to freely determine their political 
status as stated in Art 1.1 of the UN Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1994 
<http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html> 
11 In 2011, the newly elected Danish government reaffirmed Denmark’s position as fully 
supportive of the Self Rule Act, including of Greenland’s right to determine if and when it 
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But the question of independence remains controversial, and opinions 
differ among Greenlanders on how to manage the disintegration process 
between Greenland and its former colonizer. Being part of the Danish 
Realm provides important opportunities for Greenlanders to freely study, 
work and live in Denmark, and it is unclear how these rights would 
change in the event of Greenlandic statehood. It is also uncertain how 
Greenland would manage without the continuous flow of Danish 
professionals to the territory. At present, Danish nationals occupy the 
majority of positions requiring higher education, including in Greenland’s 
educational sector, health care system, defense, bureaucracy, and in the 
private sector.   
Thus, the potential withdrawal of Greenland from the Danish Realm 
comes not without uncertainties about how the territory will handle 
standing on its own. 
For this reason, not everybody believes in statehood as the ultimate goal. 
“What do they want from statehood that we do not already have?” asks 
Kaj Kleist, former director of the Home Rule government, now working 
for London Mining in Nuuk. After his long experience in Greenland’s 
political life, Kleist is certain that his country is better off staying within 
the Danish Realm. “Statehood should not be a goal in itself,” Kleist 
argues, adding that Greenland has too many economic and administrative 
challenges to realistically pursue full independence. 12  
Kleist is not alone in holding that the idea of Greenlandic independence 
should be discarded. His arguments correspond to those of the political 
party Atassut, which is in favour of Greenland remaining within the 
Danish Realm. Atassut, which means Unity, got eight per cent of the 
votes in Greenland’s election in March 2013.13   
Despite a certain part of the population viewing Greenland as better off 
remaining within the Danish Realm, the political desire for increased 
autonomy and eventual independence remains a defining feature of 
Greenlandic politics. Aspirations of independence were reflected in the 
public sentiment dominating debates and public meetings ahead of the 
2013 elections, as well as in voting patterns: 78 per cent of voters 
expressed their support for one of the two largest parties, Siumut and 
Inuit Atakatigiit, which are both working toward Greenlandic indepen-
dence.14   
                                                                                                                       
wants to withdraw from the Danish Realm. The government also declared their support 
for the ongoing work with drafting a Greenlandic constitution. See Fisker, Mads: Ny 
regering respekterer Grønlandsk grundlov. KNR News, October 3, 2011.  
12 The interview with Kaj Kleist took place in London Mining’s offices in Nuuk, 
Greenland, on March 24, 2013.  
13 This of course depends on the extent to which Greenlanders voted for Atassut based on 
the party’s image as more ”Danish-friendly” and as against independence. In a society 
like Greenland, where the largest city counts 16,000 people, party affiliation may not be 
based only on party platforms, but also on personal affiliations, geographical location, and 
other aspects. Still, the support for Atassut is the best and most recent measure available 
for the proportion of Greenlanders actively opposing independence. 
14 The two largest parties, Siumut and Inuit Atakatigiit, got 43 and 35 per cent of the 
votes, respectively. The leaders of both these parties have expressed that they work for an 
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Yet statehood does not have to be a reality for the effects of Greenland’s 
significant territorial autonomy to be evident. In a time when increasing 
international attention is directed toward the Arctic and its debated 
resource potential, the very possibility of Greenland becoming a state is 
already affecting how the world’s largest island can position itself among 
foreign states – and draw investments to its high-cost resource industries. 
Public election meetings in Nuuk in the winter of 2013 reflected that 
Greenland is indeed facing new political choices which could alter its ties 
to Copenhagen and bring about substantial economic growth. For 
instance, the potential import of thousands of Chinese migrant workers to 
facilitate the construction of large-scale industrial projects was at the core 
of the election debates, illustrating the arrival of global economic forces 
to the world’s largest island. Descriptively, political commentator Jørgen 
Chemnitz characterized the 2013 elections as “Greenland’s year zero,” 
thus marking the beginning of a whole new era.15  
In the past 300 years of colonial rule, efforts toward self-government 
have been directed solely toward Copenhagen, and Greenland’s place in 
the world has been defined in relation to Denmark. Today, Greenland is 
moving away from the Danish Realm as its absolute point of reference, 
and is making its international resource diplomacy a priority in order to 
reposition itself in relation to a larger community of states. 
2.2 Inviting the World In: Greenland’s International 
Resource Strategy 
As a result of obtaining jurisdiction over its natural resources, Greenland 
has been free to pursue a strategy of inviting foreign investors to explore 
and extract fossil fuels, minerals and rare earths. Nine international oil 
companies currently hold licenses in Greenland’s territorial waters, 
including Shell, Statoil and Husky Energy.16 The largest license-holder, 
Scottish Cairn Energy, has so far spent more than one billion dollars on 
seismic exploration and test drilling off the Greenlandic coast.17 The 
company has yet to make any commercial findings in the Greenlandic 
subsoil. But according to the head of Cairn Energy’s operational office in 
Nuuk, Tor B. Lund, the optimism has not declined, and the company has 
no plans to withdraw from Greenland.18 On the minerals side, the 
Ministry of Minerals and Petroleum has so far awarded a total of more 
                                                                                                                       
independent Greenland. Unequivocally, Premier Aleqa Hammond recently stated: ”We 
want full independence.” Quoted in Skov, Oliver Routhe  and Rasmussen, Rasmus: 
Valgkamp i Grønland: Siumut vil ud av riksfællesskabet. Danish National Broadcast, 
February 20, 2013. 
15 Gudmundson, Sine: Kommentator: Grønlands viktigste valg noensinne. Danish 
Broadcasting Service, March 12, 2013.  
16 Shell, Statoil, Husky Energy, Dong Energy, GDF Suez, Maersk Oil, Tullow Oil and 
Conoco Phillips are all members of the Greenland Oil Industry Association, a forum for 
companies holding licenses in Greenland. See <http://www.goia.gl/about-goia/member-
companies.aspx> 
17 Cairn Energy official web portal on exploration and drilling in Greenland: 
<http://www.cairnenergy.com/index.asp?pageid=78> 
18 Interview with Tor B. Lund was conducted in the offices of Cairn Energy in Nuuk, on 
March 13, 2013. 
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than 150 exploration licenses to foreign companies, compared to only a 
handful a decade ago. The annual number of licenses issued have risen 
from 17 in 2002 to 94 in 2011. Especially the mining of rare earths, 
which are essential for the production of modern technology such as LED 
screens, smartphones and computer chips, have been staked out as the 
possible prescription to end Greenland’s economic dependency. Today, 
China has a virtual monopoly on the production of rare earths, providing 
95 per cent of global supply.19 
In December 2012, the Greenlandic parliament passed a controversial law 
that makes it possible for large-scale industrial projects to employ foreign 
workers at a wage far lower than the Greenlandic minimum wage. This 
was done in the context of the planned Isua mining project, worth 2.3 
billion dollars, which is to be undertaken by London Mining. Although 
this company is registered in Britain, the capital behind its investments in 
Greenland comes from the Chinese Development Bank. The project is 
estimated to employ about 3,000 Chinese workers on the various 
construction sites, which are located from the bottom of the Nuuk fjord 
system and up to the edge of the inland ice sheet.20 
The externally financed development of Greenland’s resource potential is 
taking place within a changing framework of Arctic geopolitics, where 
the discovery of natural resources and increasingly ice-free shipping 
routes have shaped a new political reality. This reality is characterized by 
tenser rhetorical exchanges between governments of the five Arctic 
littoral states,21 and by these states’ competing jurisdictional claims over 
different areas of Arctic waters. The most famous ongoing dispute is 
between Denmark, Canada and Russia concerning the sovereignty over 
the North Pole, a legal question which will be determined by the United 
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, based on 
geological evidence of underwater ridges.  
The search for such evidence was the motivation behind the Russian 
expedition which in 2007 planted a Russian flag on the seabed directly 
under the North Pole. This event represented a turning point for Arctic 
international affairs. Other Arctic states immediately reacted to the 
Russian stunt, with responses ranging from smiles and laughter from 
Danish officials to rage from the Canadians.22 Journalists were quick to 
write about “a new cold war” and the beginning of a “scramble for the 
Arctic.”23 Academic authors have also contributed to the framing of the 
Arctic as a zone of future conflict. Among the most dramatic, Scott 
                                                     
19 Plumer, Brad: How to free the World from China’s rare Earth Stranglehold. 
Washington Post, September 16, 2011. 
20 Interview with Kaj Kleist, London Mining’s Information Director in Greenland, took 
place in London Mining’s offices in Nuuk, on April 23, 2013. On the topic of London 
Mining in Greenland, see also Parello-Plesner, Jonas: China and Greenland: Digging for 
Trouble. European Council on Foreign Relations. February 7, 2013. 
<http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/china_and_greenland_digging_for_trouble> 
21 These are Norway, Denmark, Canada, Russia, and the United States. 
22 Roed, Fredrik: Danmark griner av Ruslands flag på Nordpolen. Avisen, August 3, 
2007.  
23 See for example NATO Prepares for cold wars. Izvestia, February 1, 2009, 
 or Parfitt, Tom: Russia plants flag on North Pole seabed. The Guardian, August 7, 2007. 
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Borgerson has described a scenario of a “security meltdown” and an 
ongoing “race to carve up the region.”24  
In 2009, international attention to Arctic sovereignty issues picked up as 
a result of some remarkable findings published by the Unites States 
Geological Survey. The projections were astonishing: 83 billion barrels 
of oil and 44 trillion cubic metres of natural gas were estimated to lie 
beneath the oceans above the Arctic circle.25 The difficulties in extracting 
these reserves remain significant, as winter darkness and harsh weather 
conditions make operations in the High North challenging and costly. But 
with high energy prices, increasingly sophisticated technology and the 
disappearance of sea ice, large-scale hydrocarbon extraction in the 
world’s roughest environment will likely be a reality of the twenty-first 
century.26 
In Greenland’s territorial waters, exploration and drilling has been made 
possible by the changing physical environment in the Arctic, where 
warmer temperatures have significantly reduced the extent of sea-ice in 
the summer. The increasing rate of glacial melt is also allowing the 
exploration of mineral deposits on the edge of the inland ice sheet, in 
areas which used to be covered by the world’s largest body of ice. No 
longer portraying itself as a victim of climate change, Greenland’s 
politicians view the warming climate as an opportunity for launching 
extractive industries at an unprecedented scale.27  
Climate change is also impacting the prospects for maritime transport 
through Arctic waters. The warming climate is leaving the Northern Sea 
Route and the North West Passage increasingly viable for commercial 
transport, tempting the shipping industry with significantly shorter 
distances between important markets. The North West Passage, which 
includes the passage between Greenland’s west coast and Canada’s 
Baffin Island, can shave 7,000 kilometers off a journey from China to the 
Atlantic coast of the United States.28 In Canada, the desire to define this 
waterway as Canadian internal waters rather than as an international strait 
has led to a majority of the parliament in Ottawa supporting to officially 
re-name it the Canadian North West Passage.29   
                                                     
24 Borgerson, Scott: Arctic Meltdown. Foreign Affairs 87, No 2, March/April, 2008, pp 
63-77.  
25 U.S. Geological Survey: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal Assessment, 2008, 
Estimates of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle. U.S. Geological Survey 
Fact Sheet 2008−3049. 
26 Indeed, Gazprom is already developing its Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, as well as 
the Prirazlomnoe field in the Pechora Sea. In Norway, the Snøhvit field in the Barents Sea 
is already producing. See Byers, Michael: Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding 
Sovereignty Disputes in the North. Douglas and MacIntyre, Toronto, 2009. Page 10. 
27 See for example the interview with Kuupik Kleist, former Premier of Greenland, in 
Politiken.dk: Kleist: Undergrund kan frigøre Grønland fra bloktilskud. January 15, 2013. 
<http://politiken.dk/politik/ECE1867973/kleist-undergrund-kan-frigoere-groenland-fra-
bloktilskud/> 
28 Byers, Michael: The Dragon Looks North. Aljazeera, December 28, 2011. 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/12/20111226145144638282.html> 
29 Byers, Michael: The North West Passage is already Canadian. Globe and Mail, 
October 26, 2009. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/the-northwest-
passage-is-already-canadian/article4356756/> 
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This example, like the planting of the Russian flag under the North Pole, 
is indicative of a geopolitical theatre playing out in the Arctic. In this 
show, patriotism is mixed with technicalities of international law, and 
made pertinent by the prospects of Arctic underground riches. The 
heightened attention around sovereignty issues in the region serves to 
strengthen the perception of the Arctic as a political hot-spot, and as “the 
world’s last energy frontier,”30 which greatly facilitates Nuuk’s creation 
of new global connections, and of a position as a recognized sovereign 
partner in business and politics. The report now turns to an investigation 
of the constructivist theory on sovereignty and recognition, situating the 
case of Greenland within the sphere of theoretical literature.  
 
  
                                                     
30 Nuttall, Mark: Self-Rule in Greenland: Towards the world’s first Inuit State? 
Indigenous Affairs No 3/4, 2008. Pp 66. 
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3  Literature Review and Theoretical Argument 
The state is the highest manifestation of reason.    
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 182031 
We want full independence. We want to move away from Danish 
subsidies. Greenland aims to assume responsibility for all political areas 
and work for a future sovereign state.  
Aleqa Hammond, Premier of Greenland, 201332 
As a core concept within disciplines of international law and political 
science, sovereignty is at the centre of much academic discussion in the 
area of international affairs. Literature from both fields have informed 
this report, as Greenland’s reorientation in the Arctic region, and indeed, 
in the world, is shaped by the set of legal and political ideas that govern 
the way sovereignty is perceived and practiced in international affairs. 
This report aims to illustrate that by playing up its sovereignty over 
natural resources, the Greenlandic government is able to strengthen its 
position in a manner which makes this Arctic territory look more and 
more like a sovereign state. 
The fundamental question of what constitutes the nature of sovereignty is 
at the heart of this report. It shares the perspective of authors such as 
Rebecca Adler Nissen and Ulrik Pram Gad, who hold that “sovereignty is 
not a ‘thing’ either present or absent. On the contrary, sovereignty 
unfolds in the legal and political games that must be studied as both 
discourses and practices.”33 This report sets out to do just that; to study in 
detail the unfolding of sovereignty in a territory with a unique self-
government arrangement, in the context of a strong political ambition of 
independence. It does so with a constructivist conception of sovereignty 
as intrinsically mouldable, responsive to the interplay between actors’ 
political agenda and the structure in which they operate. 
The report is grounded in a constructivist approach in line with the theory 
of scholars such as Emanuel Adler,34 thus allowing for social relation-
ships and cognitive structures to shape meaning in the observable world. 
As noted by John Gerard Ruggie, constructivists hold that “the building 
blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material.”35 Hence, 
the report is based on the idea that sovereignty, with its associated bundle 
                                                     
31 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: The Philosophy of Right, in Great Books of the 
Western World. Mortimer J. Adler ed., T. M. Knox trans., 2d ed, 1990. 
32 Quoted in Skov, Oliver Routhe  and Rasmussen, Rasmus: Valgkamp i Grønland: 
Siumut vil ud av riksfællesskabet. Danish National Broadcast, February 20, 2013. 
<http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik/2013/02/20/214025.htm> 
33 Adler Nissen, Rebecca and Pram Gad, Ulrik, ed: European Integration and Post-
Colonial Sovereignty Games. The EU Overseas Countries and Territories. Routeledge, 
2013. 
34 Adler, Emanuel: Seizing the Middle Ground. Constructivism in World Politics. 
European Journal of World Relations. September, 1997, Vol 3, No 3, pp 319-363.  
35 Ruggie, John Gerard: What makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and 
the Social Constructivist Challenge. International Organization, Vol 52, Issue 4, 
September 1998, pp 855-885. 
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of rights and obligations, is a mouldable concept that is responsive to a 
wide range of trends in international society. A constructivist view on 
sovereignty implies that actors in the international system are able to 
unbundle and reinterpret this concept, persistently subjecting it to the 
normative foundations on which the international system rests.   
According to JDB Miller, sovereignty is defined by the principle of 
recognition: “Just as we know a camel or a chair when we see one, so we 
know a sovereign state. It is a political entity that is treated as a sovereign 
state by other sovereign states.”36 The same principle is emphasized by 
Stephen Krasner when he reiterates that a crucial aspect of sovereignty is 
the ability to enter into agreements with other states and international 
organizations.37 These authors thus focus on the practice of recognition as 
central to sovereignty, and as the key to understanding how the concept 
plays out in international politics.  
The emphasis on recognition is shared by Cynthia Weber and Thomas 
Biersteker, who define sovereignty as “a political entity’s externally 
recognized right to exersise final authority over its affairs.” 38 The focus 
on external recognition reflects the authors’ core argument that sover-
eignty is an inherently social construct. The global community of states, 
they write, constitutes a social world where sovereignty is being created 
in the process of state interaction. In the social environment of states, 
sovereignty is being constantly re-interpreted to correspond to changing 
normative conceptions about how to conduct international politics. 
Therefore, Weber and Biersteker emphasize the provisional nature of 
their definition of sovereignty, as they believe a definition can never 
capture the essence of a concept which constantly undergoes change.39 
Cynthia Weber’s volume “Simulating Sovereignty” further contributes to 
an understanding of the subject by investigating how the meaning of 
sovereignty is expressed through discourse and diplomatic practices, and 
how these elements are in effect “writing the state.”40 Rather than looking 
at how sovereignty is represented in international relations, Weber urges 
an investigation of how sovereignty is simulated in the social community 
of states.41 Using the theoretical framework of Jean Baudrillard, Weber 
develops the idea that in order to be sovereign, a state must exercise 
control over the source of its sovereign authority, and simulate the 
boundaries which mark the limits of these powers. These boundaries may 
be between the domestic and the international, or between citizen and 
foreigner.42  
                                                     
36 Miller, JBD: The World of States: Connected Essays. St. Martin’s Press, 1981. Page 16. 
37 Krasner Stephen D: Compromising Westphalia. International Security 20(3), 1995, pp 
115–151. 
38 Biersteker, Thomas J. And Weber, Cynthia, ed: State Sovereignty as a Social Construct. 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. Page 2. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Weber, Cynthia: Simulating Sovereignty. Intervention, the State, and Symbolic 
Exchange. Cambridge University Press, 1995. ”Writing the State” is the title of the book’s 
first chapter. 
41 Ibid, page 10.  
42 Ibid, page 125-129.  
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In Greenlandic politics, the primary boundary indicating the limits of 
sovereignty is between Nuuk and Copenhagen; between the colonizer and 
the colonized. Thus, Nuuk’s projection of autonomy always implies 
creating an indentity on the international stage as intrinsically non-
Danish. By manipulating and controlling the jurisdictive limitations of 
power imposed by Denmark, the government in Nuuk is able to shape an 
image of Greenland as a political entity with all the characteristics of a 
state. This projection of sovereignty has been successful to the extent that 
foreign governments are indeed starting to treat Greenland like a state, 
and Nuuk as the supreme authority over Greenlandic affairs – all this 
despite Copenhagen’s continued jurisdiction over Greenland’s foreign 
affairs and security policy. By using the Arctic geopolitical sphere as a 
arena where sovereignty can be displayed and practiced, Nuuk is 
effectively constituting its own sovereignty by playing up its jurisdiction 
over economic matters and natural resources. As this report will 
highlight, the potentiality of large-scale resource extraction as a defining 
feature of Arctic geopolitics has allowed Greenland to situate itself as a 
prospective treasure chest of hydrocarbons and minerals. The 
strengthening independent relationships between Greenland and foreign 
governments, and Nuuk’s conscious formation of these relationships, 
testify to a territory which is evolving into a state-like entity. 
The Self Rule Act has made it possible for Greenland to seek inter-
national recognition in a manner which was previously inconceivable. In 
accordance with the Act, the Greenlandic government can enter into 
legally binding agreements with other states and state-based organi-
zations on policy areas where it has full competence, such as fisheries, 
climate or economic policy, including foreign investment.43 According to 
Natalia Loukacheva, this legal arrangement is unique in a global context: 
no other state grants such extensive powers to a territorial government. 
As a consequence of the Self Rule Act, Greenland enjoys a state-like 
status as an equal part in negotiations that solely concern its territory, and 
in certain cases has international legal personality in a manner usually 
reserved for states.44  
The continuously developing division of legislative and administrative 
powers between Denmark and Greenland translates into a blurry scenario 
of overlapping and interacting sovereignties. As pointed out by 
Loukacheva, Greenland has succeeded in expanding its jurisdiction into 
areas that are traditionally non-transferable to a sub-state entity, such as 
foreign affairs, and is continuously testing the limits for where the Self 
Rule government can move independently. Reflecting the multiple layers 
of sovereignty at work in the Self Rule Act, Loukachava calls this 
                                                     
43 Greenland can enter into legally binding agreements with foreign governments, but it 
can not sign such an agreement with its own name. Instead, the formula The Kingdom of 
Denmark, on behalf of Greenland, must be used. See the legal text in Bureau for 
Inatsisartut: Inatsisartutlov nr. 26 af 18. november 2010: Lov om Inatsisartut og 
Naalakkersuisut. November 18, 2010. 
44 Loukacheva, Natalia: Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and 
Nunavut. University of Toronto Press, 2007. 
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arrangement a “constitutional hybrid.”45 The very idea of constitutional 
sovereignty as a hybrid compromises the traditional legal view of 
sovereignty as an either-or concept, and allows for the legal competences 
of states and self-governed territories to overlap in ways that spur the 
necessity to rethink the definition of territorial sovereignty.  
This challenge is taken up by Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, who 
illustrate how states are becoming increasingly willing to reshape the 
meaning of sovereignty to fit political goals, including by sharing 
authority in new and innovative ways. The relationship between Nuuk 
and Copenhagen resonates with what Cooley and Spruyt describe as a 
“hybrid sovereignty relation,” where the long-term consequences are 
uncertain and the actors have “no clear view of the durability of the 
arrangement.”46 The history of Greenlandic Self Rule also fits their 
description of a decolonization process where the colony has been 
content to achieve partial sovereignty where this has “accelerated the 
process of imperial withdrawal.”47 As this report will highlight, foreign 
affairs and security represent the policy areas currently being transferred 
from Copenhagen to Nuuk, through the Greenlandic government’s 
conscious projection of sovereignty toward the outside world. 
Within the Self Rule framework, Nuuk is actively inventing and re-
inventing legal and political mechanisms in order to strengthen the 
government’s particular view of its own sovereignty. This process is 
indicative of what Rebecca Adler Nissen and Ulrik Pram Gad call 
“sovereignty games.” Increasingly evident in the political milieu of the 
Danish Realm and in Greenland’s external relations, sovereignty games 
are the processes in which actors play on various meanings of sovereignty 
in order to expand their scope of influence.48  
Taking the analysis of Adler Nissen and Pram Gad one step further, this 
report claims that the Greenlandic government not only takes advantage 
of changing international norms when playing sovereignty games, but 
engages directly in the formation of these norms. Due to the rising 
international interest in the Arctic, Greenland’s manoeuvring within the 
framework of the Self Rule Act is being increasingly noted by other 
actors. Foreign governments have no choice but to relate to Nuuk rather 
than to Copenhagen when negotiating about investments in infrastructure 
for resource extraction, or about exploration licenses.  
As this report will highlight, Nuuk’s jurisdiction over subsoil resources 
has opened up a larger space for its political manoeuvring. Within the 
sphere of Arctic geopolitics, this space has allowed the Greenlandic 
government to project a sovereignty which goes beyond the formal 
                                                     
45 Loukacheva, Natalia: Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and 
Nunavut. University of Toronto Press, 2007. 
46 Cooley, Alexander and Spruyt, Hendrik: Contracting States. Princeton University 
Press, 2009. Page 3. 
47 Ibid, page 5. 
48 Adler Nissen, Rebecca and Pram Gad, Ulrik, ed: European Integration and Post-
Colonial Sovereignty Games. The EU Overseas Countries and Territories. Routeledge, 
2013, p 4. 
14 Lisa Linnea Erdal 
 
limitations of the Self Rule Act, and which lays the foundation for future 
independence and statehood.  
 
  
 Independence on the Horizon 15 
 
4  Methodology  
This report uses qualitative methods of analysis, employing both 
theoretical and empirical literature to develop and support its arguments. 
It also makes use of qualitative interviews to inform the analysis of 
Greenlandic foreign policy strategies. These interviews were conducted 
in the period March-May 2013, and have contributed valuable perspec-
tives from informed persons within Greenlandic society. Former and 
current politicians, bureaucrats and professors have offered their personal 
insights and provided their interpretations of current events in Greenland. 
The sensitive political nature of the topic of Greenlandic independence 
and resource strategies, including undisclosed information on foreign 
investment, has meant that not all interviewees were willing to speak on 
record. Many interveiews are therefore not quoted nor in any way 
referred to in this report. 
By spending several months in Greenland’s capital city before and during 
the general elections of 2013, the author has gained access to a wide 
range of local sources and media, from public hearings and election 
debates, to newspapers and radio. By giving a detailed account of the 
political dilemmas surrounding resource extraction, economic develop-
ment and sovereignty issues, local media sources and public meetings 
have been central in informing this report. On-going political discussions 
expressed in Danish media have also been of importance in under-
standing the dynamics playing out within the Danish Realm. Paying 
attention to both sides of the changing relationship between Denmark and 
its former Arctic colony has been decisive for the analysis of Greenland’s 
political processes, which are being shaped in accordance with the 
possibilities and constrains that follow from the structure of the Danish 
Realm. 
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5 Emerging Relations Between Greenland and 
North East Asia 
5.1 Chinese Interests in the Arctic: A Stepping Stone for 
Greenlandic Independence  
Very small Arctic investments for China can warrant very big rewards in 
the future. It is a low risk and obvious choice.  
Malte Humpert, Excecutive Director of the Arctic Institute in Washington DC 49 
Nobody should blame Greenland for moving on to Asian investors and the 
Chinese workforce when its closer neighbours have nothing to offer.  
Jonas Parello-Plesner, European Council on Foreign Relations 50 
In a time when the world is directing increasing attention toward the 
Arctic, one state is standing out as the most controversial player in the 
High North. China has emphasized its interest in the Arctic on several 
arenas, from science and rare earths to maritime transportation. In 2012, 
the Xuelong, or Snow Dragon, made the headlines as the first Chinese 
icebreaker to complete an Arctic expedition. The successful journey was 
followed by a declaration that China will build another state of the art 
icebreaker.51  
In 2013, China stepped up its investments in Arctic oil and gas, with 
president Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow finalizing deals on large Chinese 
investments in Russia’s northern oil and gas sectors.52 China has also 
invested heavily in Iceland’s economy after the country’s financial 
collapse in 2008, and has expanded the Chinese embassy to become 
Reykjavik’s largest foreign office, with the ability to accommodate up to 
500 personnel.53  
China has also been knocking on the door of the Arctic Council, and its 
application for permanent observer status in this organization was 
approved by the member states in May 2013. Notably, in the application 
for permanent observer status, China presented itself as a “near-Arctic 
state.”54 As pointed out by scholars on Chinese foreign policy, China 
                                                     
49 Kaiman, Jonathan: China pours cash into melting Arctic in bid to win influence. The 
Guardian, March 18, 2013. 
50 Parello-Plesner, Jonas: China and Greenland: Digging for Trouble. European Council 
on Foreign Relations. February 7, 2013. 
<http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/china_and_greenland_digging_for_trouble> 
51 Jacobson, Linda: Northeast Asia turns its attention toward the Arctic. Lowy Institute 
for International Policy/Australian National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis Brief, 
December 18, 2012. 
52 Katakei, Rakteem: Russia lets China into Arctic rush as energy giants embrace. 
Bloomberg, March 25, 2013. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-25/russia-cuts-
china-into-arctic-oil-rush-as-energy-giants-embrace.html> 
53 Pickering, Thomas R. and Benediktsson, Einar: China knocks on Iceland’s door.  
International Herald Tribune, March 12, 2013. 
54 As emphasized by Kluth, Michael and Lynggaard, Kennet: Why is Denmark China’s 
biggest fan in the Arctic Council? Public lecture at Greenland’s University, Nuuk, on May 
27, 2013.  
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views its participation in Arctic governance issues as a natural pre-
rogative based on its status as a global power.55 In the words of Pankaj 
Ghemawat, “the world talks about the emergence of China as if it were a 
new phenomenon, while in Beijing it is simply seen as a return to the 
natural state of things: a state in which China comes first in everything.”56 
In the context of Chinese superpower ambitions and its rising interest in 
the Arctic, the 56,000 inhabitants of the world’s largest island find 
themselves in the centre of a geopolitical development with far-reaching 
ramifications. Increasing Chinese attention toward the Arctic is indeed 
manifesting itself in Greenland, where Beijing’s gaze toward the North is 
providing a unique opportunity for the government in Nuuk to strengthen 
its position vis-à-vis Copenhagen, and to test the legal and political limits 
of the current Self Rule arrangement. The prospected Chinese invest-
ments in Greenland’s mineral sector are providing a dual service to the 
government in Nuuk by securing capital to its high-cost projects and 
allowing for the development of independent relations between 
Greenland and the world’s new economic superpower. The latter is 
notable in itself: Greenland has been used to existing on the fringe of 
international affairs, with the exception of certain American strategic 
interests in the territory.57 Now, China’s urgent need for new resources is 
putting Greenland’s mineral wealth on the map in Beijing and causing 
unprecedented interest from journalists, scholars, strategists and 
politicians in the island’s on-going developments.  
As pointed out by Linda Jacobson and Lee Syong-Hong, the overriding 
motive of China’s interests in the High North is connected to economic 
growth. Sustaining China’s formidable growth rates is necessary to obtain 
the principal rationale of the Communist Party, which is to maintain 
political stability and keep the Party in power.58 In this context, China’s 
involvement in Greenland can be seen as an economic exploration of a 
new resource frontier, as well as an extension of the desire to politically 
influence a region which may become crucial for shipping and resource 
extraction. Securing good-will among Nuuk’s politicians and bureaucrats 
is likely a sound investment for China, especially given the anticipation 
of future Greenlandic independence.  
As pointed out by Mininnguaq Kleist at Greenland’s Bureau of Foreign 
Affairs, the combination of an Arctic location and a prediction of future 
independence is exactly what draws states’ attention to Greenland, and 
                                                     
55 See Jacobson, Linda: Northeast Asia turns its attention toward the Arctic. Lowy 
Institute for International Policy/Australian National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis 
Brief, December 18, 2012. 
56 Cardenal, Juan Pablo ans Araujo, Heriberto: China’s Silent Army: The Pioneers, 
Traders, Fixers and Workers Who are Remaking the World in Beijing’s Image. Penguin 
Books, 2013. Page 254. 
57 The Thule Air Base, which is the US Defense’s northermost satelite station and an 
important part of its missile defense program, is located in Thule on the north-west coast 
of Greenland. The US has previously operated several other air bases in Greenland, all of 
which have now been made civil and turned over to the Greenlandic government. 
58 Jacobson, Linda and Lee Syong-Hong: Interests in the Arctic and Possible Cooperation 
with the Kingdom of Denmark. Report prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 16, 2013.   
18 Lisa Linnea Erdal 
 
what makes the island an interesting partner for foreign governments. 
Greenland’s foreign relations are in the making, and the government is 
eager to establish new ties to other states and investors which can further 
Nuuk’s economic and political ambitions.59 In this context, Greenland 
represents a potentially important ally for states such as China, which 
does not have a say in Arctic governance nor is granted access to its 
resources. Building a strong relationship to Nuuk is an opportunity for 
Beijing to secure its standing with a territory which will likely occupy an 
important space in the future Arctic political sphere.  
And a close Greenlandic-Chinese relationship is warmly welcomed by 
the government in Nuuk. According to Klaus Georg Hansen, Greenland 
is looking for partners who do not view the country as helpless and in 
constant need of assistance. A new self-image for Greenland, and the 
projection of this self-image abroad, implies that Nuuk will forge 
relationships to states that affirm the idea of Greenland as an independent 
decision-maker and a worthwhile business partner.60 Recalling Biersteker 
and Weber’s emphasis on sovereignty as a concept shaped through 
processes of social interaction, Greenland depends on external recog-
nition of its government for the meaningful exercise of sovereignty in the 
international sphere. The recognition it gets from foreign actors in turn 
allows the Self Rule government to project this authority toward 
Copenhagen, and insist on being viewed as the legitimate governor over 
all matters pertaining to Greenland.   
The widening and deepening of diplomatic ties is at the heart of Nuuk’s 
strategy of establishing international recognition of its government. Nuuk 
is utilizing Beijing’s attentiveness toward the Arctic in an intelligent way 
to challenge the extent of the Self Rule Act, and is making important 
strides toward taking control over its own foreign policy. This was 
evident in the two visits of Greenland’s previous minister of Industry and 
Natural Resources, Ove Karl Berthelsen, to China in 2011, where he was 
welcomed by Chinese Vice-Premier Li Keqiang. The way Berthelsen was 
received has been characterized by Damien Degeorges as “more than 
exceptional” given the non-state status of Greenland. According to 
Degeorges, the high-level reception was indicative of the importance of 
Greenland as a future economic partner to China.61 Berthelsen’s visits 
were followed up by an official Chinese state visit to Nuuk in April 2012, 
where minister of Land and Resources Xu Shaoshi arrived together with a 
delegation of nine people and met with former Premier Kuupik Kleist to 
discuss issues of Chinese investments in Greenland’s mineral sector, 
especially with regard to rare earths.62 
                                                     
59 Interview with Minninguaq Kleist took place at the Greenlandic Government offices in 
Nuuk, on March 24th 2013. 
60 Hansen, Klaus Georg: Uavhengigheten og oljen. Lecture at the conference Geopolitics 
in the High North at Greenland’s University, Nuuk, May 5, 2013. 
61 Degeorges, Damien: The Role of Greenland in the Arctic. In Laboratoire de INSEM 
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 Independence on the Horizon 19 
 
This series of meetings were likely a boost to Greenland’s self-perception 
as an independent actor in world politics. The opportunity to send high-
level politicians abroad to meet with similarly prominent officials from 
other states is not a given for a self-governed territory of 56,000 people, 
whose foreign policy is officially controlled by the former colonial 
power. Still, acting in a state-like manner, Greenland has managed to 
launch independent diplomatic relations with a rising world power.  
According to Ove Karl Berthelsen, opening doors to other states in order 
to attract investment and know-how has been a fundamental strategy of 
Greenland’s government. Not many years ago, Berthelsen recalls, there 
was minimal interest from abroad in investing in Greenland.63 Today, the 
situation has changed dramatically. Greenland has attracted investment 
from nine transnational oil companies64 and witnessed an exponential 
increase in the number of mineral licenses issued.65 Berthelsen also 
describes how China’s interest in Greenland has strengthened the 
country’s position within the Danish Realm and provided much-needed 
experience in conducting high-level diplomacy. He emphasizes that 
building competence in the conduction of foreign relations is crucial in 
the light of future independence for his country, and that creating ties to 
other states and foreign actors thereby has a long-term purpose.66  
This strategy is also reflected in the program of Inuit Ataqatigiit, 
Berthelsen’s political party, which outlines a plan to create a Department 
of Foreign Affairs to replace the current Directorate.67 The establishment 
of a proper department for the conduction of international relations would 
represent an important stride toward an independent Greenland, and 
would leave no doubt as to where foreign representatives would direct 
their attention when dealing with the Arctic part of the Danish Realm. 
Changing the label from Directorate to Department would indicate a 
Greenlandic foreign policy competence amounting to that of any 
sovereign state, thus compromising Copenhagen’s control over the 
foreign affairs of the Realm as whole. This would have important 
ramifications for Denmark, putting into question the nature of the Realm 
as one single actor in international relations, and introducing, for the first 
time, a non-state entity with a fully recognized Department of Foreign 
Affairs.  
The emerging Greenlandic-Chinese relationship is indicative of a 
competence-building which may well translate into Greenland designing 
its fully independent international relations in the future. This is a crucial 
                                                     
63 Ove Karl Berthelsen was minister of Industry and Natural Resources from 2009-2013. 
The interveiw with Berthelsen took place in Nuuk on May 29, 2013.  
64 Members of the Greenland Oil Industry Association include Husky Energy, Shell, 
Statoil, Chevron, GDF Suez, ConocoPhilips, and Cairn Energy, in addition to Danish 
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65 Greenland Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum: Greenland Mineral Exploration in Brief 
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66 The interveiw with Ove Karl Berthelsen took place in Nuuk on May 29, 2013.  
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aspect of Greenland’s statebuilding process, as it forces outside actors to 
treat Nuuk as the legitimate Arctic power within the Danish Realm. As 
such, Nuuk is promoting a recognition of its sovereignty in Arctic affairs 
onto other states in a powerful manner. As foreign officials are getting 
used to dealing with the Greenlandic government in the same way they 
deal with the government of any sovereign state, Nuuk is making pivotal 
progress toward international recognition.  
The fact that foreign governments are starting to treat Nuuk as the 
legitimate location for all decision-making concerning Greenland’s 
external affairs is absolutely crucial to the island’s statebuilding process. 
Recalling Biersteker and Weber’s analysis, recognition is pivotal in 
defining sovereignty. In the world of states, and in the Arctic geopolitical 
context, Greenland is part of a social environment where state interaction 
is shaping the meaning of sovereignty, a meaning which is never spatially 
or temporally fixed. Bearing in mind the socially constructed nature of 
sovereignty, Greenland’s diplomatic practice should be understood in 
terms of Weber’s idea of “writing the state.”68 Here, Greenland is being 
remarkably successful at constituting its own sovereignty. At the base of 
this sovereignty is the control over Greenland’s huge resource potential, 
which forms the core of foreign actors’ interest in the Arctic territory. 
In the summer of 2013, Greenland’s national mining company Nuna 
Minerals will host a large Chinese business delegation consisting of 
representatives from seven Chinese mining and investment companies, as 
well as the Chinese Development Bank.69 This will be the largest 
delegation from China to visit Greenland so far. The Chinese firms and 
investment institutions have declared that they are interested in exploring 
possibilities for engaging in mining activities in Greenland, and they will 
meet with a range of politicians and businesses in Nuuk. These meetings 
will be regarded by the Greenlandic government as creating a most 
valuable connection to investors that have the capital needed to spark a 
resource adventure on the island. The meetings will also be seen as a 
strong signal of where negotiations concerning Greenlandic mining 
should take place; the delegation is not bound for Copenhagen, but for 
Nuuk, and no Danish official will take part in the meetings. Despite the 
inseparability of conducting foreign policy and building relations to the 
Chinese Development Bank, Copenhagen is choosing not to interfere in 
the negotiations between Greenlandic politicians and representatives from 
the bank.  
This does not mean that Copenhagen is inattentive to the emerging 
relationship between Nuuk and Beijing. On the contrary, the intersection 
of Chinese and Greenlandic interests has produced a fear in Copenhagen 
that Denmark will be pushed further to the background of Arctic affairs. 
Accusations that Danish politicians did not understand the implications of 
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the Self Rule Act in 2009 have proliferated together with the rising 
attention on the Arctic and Greenland’s efforts to promote its business 
opportunities internationally. After Nuuk’s passing of the so-called large-
scale law, which allows for the import of thousands of foreign workers to 
Greenland’s planned industrial projects, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the 
leader of Denmark’s largest political party, Venstre, demanded a “time-
out” to re-investigate the Self Rule Act. He wanted to look into how 
Denmark could cooperate with Greenland to extract resources, and thus 
create an alternative to Chinese investments, the introduction of which 
made him “deeply concerned.”70 Sara Olsvig, who holds one of the two 
seats at the Danish Parliament that are reserved for Greenlanders, 
responded by pointing out that within the current legal arrangement 
“Denmark does not have a time-out card to play.” She emphasized that 
political choices concerning labour, resources and economic development 
are within the legal competence of the Greenlandic government, and thus 
can not be interfered with by Copenhagen.71  
Through the formation of independent economic relationships to China 
and other foreign actors, Greenland’s government is showing 
Copenhagen that it intends to forge alliances based on a common interests 
in developing Greenland’s resource potential, not on former colonial ties.  
As Denmark has transferred the jurisdiction over more and more policy 
areas to Nuuk, sovereignty has shifted in a manner which supports 
Cooley and Spruyt’s analysis of sovereignty as something which is 
“dynamically exchanged and transferred.”72 This shift in the location of 
decision making power has made it possible for Greenland to emerge as 
the Danish Realm’s principal driver of Arctic affairs. As crucial strategies 
on resource extraction are now being designed by the Greenlandic 
government, it is Nuuk which is gradually becoming the centre for the 
shaping of the Realm’s Arctic policies. Although part of the policy 
making takes place under some form of cooperation or dialogue with the 
Danish Parliament, it is an enormous strength for Greenland to have the 
formal jurisdiction over its economic and resource policy.   
As emphasized by Mark Nuttall, Copenhagen’s interest in the Arctic 
increased remarkably after the establishment of Self Rule in 2009,73 
reflecting how Denmark noted the necessity of being more active in its 
northern affairs in order to retain its identity as an Arctic state. One step 
further removed from Arctic policy making, Copenhagen recognized the 
importance of holding on to its international image as an Arctic power, 
and not to compromise this status with the advent of an increasingly 
independent Arctic actor within its own Realm.  
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This was likely the motivation for the Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ commissioning of the recently released report from Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, which outlines new avenues for 
cooperation between Denmark and China, South Korea and Japan on 
Arctic affairs. In this report, the emphasis is on developing conventional 
state-to-state relations between Denmark and China, South Korea and 
Japan in order to strengthen Denmark’s position as an Arctic state.74 By 
treating Copenhagen as the legitimate possessor of Arctic sovereignty, 
the report neglects Nuuk’s recent line of policy, which emphasizes that 
Greenland is seeking out a future as an independent actor, and that it will 
not be reduced to an exotic venue which Denmark can use to brand itself 
as an Arctic state. As emphasized by Mininnguaq Kleist, when foreign 
officials visit Greenland, Denmark no longer serves as the official host. 
Instead, events involving foreign delegates are wholly organized by 
Greenland’s government, and hosted by the Greenlandic Premier. In the 
past, Denmark was the official host when inviting foreign statesmen to 
admire the stunning fjords and ice bergs, and there was minimal 
participation from local authorities. “But that time is over,” states 
Kleist.75   
The jurisdictional power over natural resources allows for Nuuk to 
conduct its own foreign affairs and security policy masqued as purely 
economic matters, and puts the Greenlandic government in charge of 
developing its own economic relations to China and others. The pushing 
and pulling for dominance over the Danish Realm’s Arctic affairs 
illustrates that sovereignty has multiple layers, and can be negotiated, 
shared, and transferred. As a result, it is not always clear where the 
absolute authority is located. This vagueness creates a certain space for 
manoeuvring, which allows Greenland’s government to carve out a more 
and more prominent role for itself within the Danish Realm, and within 
the sphere of Arctic geopolitics. By repeatedly emphasizing its full 
jurisdiction over natural resources, both in rhetoric and action, the 
Greenlandic government is using the interest from foreign actors in its 
underground riches as a source of recognition, and ultimately, of 
sovereignty. 
Interestingly, the sovereignty games at play between Greenland and 
Denmark are most clearly expressed through the states’ external relations, 
where they seem to compete on the international arena for the status as 
the highest authority over Greenland’s enormous land mass and huge 
span of territorial waters. This behaviour again lends weight to the 
theories of Miller, Krasner, Biersteker and Weber, who all identify 
external recognition as the very core of sovereignty. While Denmark is 
working through an already established network of international relations 
to strengthen its status as an Arctic state, including by increasing northern 
cooperation with China and South Korea, the government in Nuuk rely 
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on foreign interest in its resources as the fundament for creating any 
diplomatic relations.   
Although representing important steps for the Greenlandic conduction of 
independent diplomatic relations, the official visits between Greenland 
and China should not be taken as evidence that Copenhagen is now 
superfluous in the shaping of Arctic international affairs. Neither are they 
a sign of a general Chinese acceptance of self-governing territories as 
legitimate state-like entities. Beijing chose to deal with Copenhagen, not 
Nuuk, when discussing bilateral relations, including Arctic issues, at the 
presidential visit in 2012. Notably, this was the first ever Chinese 
presidential visit to Denmark, and Hu Jintao made Copenhagen his only 
European stop on the way to the G20 summit in Mexico. The meeting, 
which officially concerned bilateral affairs between Denmark and China, 
also had Chinese interests in the Arctic on the agenda, which made many 
commentators point out that China’s visit to Denmark was closely 
connected with the planned investments in the Realm’s Arctic territory. 
“When Beijing is looking toward Denmark, the attention is really on 
Greenland,” wrote the editor-in-chief of Denmark’s largest newspaper.76  
Notably, Greenland was not invited to the bilateral meeting in 
Copenhagen. When demanding a seat at the table together with Danish 
Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt and Hu Jintao, Greenlandic 
Premier Kuupik Kleist got a firm rejection from the Danish Department 
of Foreign Affairs. This caused Greenlandic politicians to demand an 
explanation from Thorning-Schmidt as to why the territory was excluded 
from a meeting with an Arctic agenda. The Prime Minister responded by 
saying that the meeting would not touch on any issue specifically related 
to Greenland, and that it was therefore not necessary for Kleist to be 
present. In her follow-up visit to China later that year, the Greenlandic 
Premier was not invited to join.77  
From this evidence, one might be tempted to conclude that the exclusion 
of Greenland during Hu Jintao’s visit testifies to a colonial relationship 
where Greenland remains at the mercy of Copenhagen in the shaping of 
international relations in the Arctic, with no secure seat at important 
higher level meetings. But interpreting this scenario as a sign of 
Greenlandic weakness vis-à-vis Denmark would be a premature 
conclusion. Copenhagen’s behaviour around Hu Jintao’s visit should be 
seen as an attempt to regain the primacy over Arctic foreign policy and 
relations with Beijing, and thereby move the centre of power over 
Greenland back to the capital of the Danish Realm. The fact that Kleist 
was excluded from the bilateral meetings is not evidence of Nuuk’s 
insignificant position, but rather of Denmark’s weariness toward the 
developments in Greenland, in particular with regard to the territory’s 
emerging independent relations with Beijing. Recalling the analysis of 
the sovereignty games playing out between Nuuk and Copenhagen, 
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Thorning-Schmidt’s strategy is an expression of Copenhagen’s desire for 
recognition as the state which retains absolute sovereignty over 
Greenland.   
Maintaining this sovereignty is especially important in the light of a 
Greenlandic government which is moving increasingly independently not 
only in the sphere of foreign affairs, but also in another area most 
exclusive to the state, namely security policy. As the following section 
will highlight, taking control over Arctic security policy is an important 
opportunity for Greenland to project its sovereignty through dominating 
the most sensitive issues on Chinese investments. 
5.2  Greenland’s Projection of Sovereignty in the Arctic 
Security Sphere  
The risk of having a weak Greenlandic state in the Arctic has to be 
considered much more seriously, before it eventually becomes a threat. 
Damien Degeorges 78 
With the advent of foreign investments in Greenland, Denmark’s legal 
competence on foreign affairs and security policy has proven difficult to 
keep separate from Nuuk’s jurisdiction over resources and economic 
issues. In the area of security policy, Greenland is benefitting from the 
nature of security as closely connected to sovereignty and statehood. By 
emerging as the principal decision-maker on Arctic security issues, the 
Greenlandic government is moving into yet another of Copenhagen’s 
legal competences. Issues surrounding Chinese investments and Nuuk’s 
revoking of the Danish prohibition on uranium mining stand as forceful 
examples of how Greenland is using the Arctic security sphere as an 
arena to gain recognition and to project sovereignty. 
Chinese investment in the prospected Isua iron mine, situated northeast of 
Nuuk and on the edge of the inland ice sheet, has occupied much space in 
the political debate in both Denmark and Greenland. According to the 
CEO of London Mining, Graeme Hossie, Chinese construction com-
panies can be expected to play a major role in building the substantial 
infrastructure needed for the project.79 The Isua project in Greenland 
shares important characteristics with Beijing’s on-going investments in 
resource extraction in other parts of the world: the mine requires high 
initial investments in a largely unexplored territory, where there is no 
infrastructure in place. Through its state-owned banks, China has been 
able to offer unmatched investments in high-risk projects in under-
developed parts of the world, and gain valuable access to resources. 
China’s seemingly unsatisfiable demand for resources, combined with an 
unparalleled financial muscle, provides a golden opportunity for 
Greenland to secure investments in the costly extraction of its 
underground resources. This was a crucial part of the rationale behind the 
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Greenlandic government’s passing of the so-called large-scale law, which 
allows for the import of thousands of Chinese workers to facilitate the 
construction of large industrial projects.  
The potential arrival of thousands of Chinese workers, who would out-
number the population of most Greenlandic towns, has contributed to the 
scare of a “Chinese invasion” in Greenland.80 To bring down the 
scepticism expressed both by locals and by Copenhagen, Greenlandic 
politicians have consistently emphasized that Chinese workers would be 
confined within designated camps, and not be allowed to mingle with 
locals. According to previous minister of Industry and Mineral 
Resources, Ove Karl Berthelsen, this separation is necessary to “protect 
local communities.” After demands from Copenhagen, Chinese workers 
will not be allowed to use Greenland as a stepping stone to enter 
Denmark, nor to apply for asylum.81 Thus, foreign workers entering 
Greenland would do so on a permit to work on a specific project, and be 
obliged to leave as soon as the permit expires, a policy which has lead 
some to speak of Greenlanders as the new “polar mineral Sheiks.”82  
To a remarkable extent, Copenhagen has been willing to cooperate with 
Greenland on issuing work visas to foreign labourers in a way which 
would not be legal in Denmark. Notably, this illustrates that the Danish 
government is ready to make exceptions in its legislation in order to 
accommodate Greenland’s demands. As Thorkild Kjærgaard points out, 
Copenhagen could easily refuse Chinese work visas in Greenland if it 
chose to define these as a threat to national security and wished to put and 
end to Greenlandic dreams of large-scale industry fuelled by cheap 
labour.83  
The planned investment in the Isua mine has provoked stern reactions 
from Denmark, Iceland, the EU, and the US. Some have speculated that 
China’s interest in Greenland marks the beginning of a large offensive to 
secure Chinese access to Arctic resources, constituting a regional security 
threat.84 Yet others have warned that Greenland is likely to fall prey to 
clever Chinese strategies designed to build a new economic empire of the 
sort described by Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araujo in their 
analysis of Chinese global investment strategies:  
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Beijing’s powers of seduction combine the use of subliminally anti-
colonialist discourse with a chameleon-like diplomatic strategy, while 
simultaneously using multi-million-dollar investments to unfold the 
tentacles of its influence throughout the planet.
85
 
Chinese involvement in the Greenlandic economy has provoked both 
direct and indirect warnings that the Arctic island is too fragile to handle 
the financial and political weight of this Asian power. According to Nils 
Wang, the geopolitical developments in the Arctic is making it “more 
important than ever” for Greenland to be anchored within a strong Danish 
state, with the necessary institutional capacities to tackle possible future 
security challenges.86 Damien Degeorges promotes a similar perspective, 
claiming that “a country with population of 56,000 and a political elite of 
44 people is vulnerable. One only needs to convince 25 people to get 
something through, which is nothing for experienced lobbyists.”87 
Degeorges extends an explicit warning to Denmark and other Arctic 
states in claiming that the emergence of a weak Greenlandic state 
combined with powerful foreign investors should be worrying Denmark 
and other states with interests in the Arctic.88  
At Greenland’s Foreign Affairs Directorate, such warnings are received 
with smiles and head-shakes. “Greenland is not a lawless country, but an 
established democracy,” Mininnguaq Kleist points out, “We have strong 
institutions and practices to handle foreign investments and state 
interests.” Kleist emphasizes that Greenland will never fall prey to any 
foreign government, nor to powerful multinational companies. “No one 
single state or company will be allowed to grab too much power in 
Greenland. Rather, we will witness sound competition between 
businesses from many countries.”89  
Kleist’s reassurance of Greenland’s resilience is indicative of a govern-
ment with a high degree of confidence in its ability to be an independent 
actor in the Arctic security sphere. In the reorientation toward Asian 
states as future major investors, Greenland’s sovereignty game entails 
pushing for greater autonomy through actively using its jurisdiction over 
natural resources, and making this jurisdiction prevail over Danish 
security concerns. Gradually, this strategy has moved the decision-
                                                     
85 Cardenal, Juan Pablo ans Araujo, Heriberto: China’s Silent Army: The Pioneers, 
Traders, Fixers and Workers Who are Remaking the World in Beijing’s Image. Penguin 
Books, 2013. Page 254. 
86 Notably, Greenland does not have any military capabilities of its own, but relies on the 
Danish Arctic Command for military presence on the territory. See Wang, Nils: 
Sikkerhetspolitik i Arktis – en ligning med mange ubekjente. (Security policy in the Arctic 
– an equation with many unknowns). Retrieved from Danish defence 
Academy/Atlantsammenslutningen’s publication Sikkerhetspolitisk Info, January 12, 
2012. 
87 Marfelt, Birgitte: Forsker: Grønland skal ruste seg mot kinesisk dominans. Ingeniøren, 
March 30, 2012. 
88 Degeorges, Damien: Denmark, Greenland and the Arctic: Challenges and opportunities 
of becoming the meeting place of global powers. Danish Defence Academy Brief, January 
2013. Page 15. 
89 The interview with Mininnguaq Kleist took place in the offices of the Foreign Affairs 
Directorate, on April 24, 2013. 
 Independence on the Horizon 27 
 
making location on Arctic security issues from Copenhagen to Nuuk, 
representing a powerful projection of sovereignty. 
The jurisdiction over natural resources has also allowed for the 
Greenlandic government to trump Danish security concerns on another 
controversial matter, namely the extraction of uranium. In 2012, the 
Greenlandic government unanimously passed a resolution to lift the 
Danish Realm’s universal ban on uranium mining, again illustrating how 
the government’s jurisdiction over resources can override Copenhagen’s 
security policy. The signals from Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-
Schmidt indicate that the Greenlandic government will not face obstacles 
from Copenhagen on its uranium decision: “I am not principally against 
revoking the zero-tolerance on uranium. And even if I was, it would not 
matter, because it is Greenland which has the legal competence on this 
issue.”90  Thus, Greenland will likely be able to force Denmark to accept 
its decision to extract the nuclear matter, despite the deep-rooted Danish 
prohibition on nuclear substances on its territory. In Copenhagen, a 
commission is already looking into the effects of Greenland’s potential 
uranium extraction on Denmark’s membership in the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). According to the legal framework of 
IAEA, costly infrastructure, effective control mechanisms, and strict 
inspection schemes must be in place in order to comply with the 
organization’s laws. 
But not all Danish politicians have followed the Prime Minister’s line on 
the uranium issue in Greenland. The topic has produced much public 
controversy, and Denmark’s largest opposition party has declared that it 
is not in favour of lifting the ban on nuclear substances.91 The lack of 
adequate international mechanisms for the trading of uranium, and the 
fear that the substance might end up in the wrong hands, has made many 
in Copenhagen sceptical of the development in Greenland. With no 
technical experience in the mining of nuclear substances, Denmark will 
not be able to perform the necessary control functions in a potential 
Greenlandic uranium project. Thus, Greenland will rely on foreign 
expertise on all aspects of the activity, from exploration to inspection and 
control mechanisms. This likely adds a layer of wariness to Danish 
politicians, on top of the strongly felt distinction of Denmark as a country 
holding an uncompromising attitude against nuclear power since 1988.92   
Given these uncertainties, and the deeply embedded anti-nuclear 
sentiment in Denmark, it is remarkable that Greenland’s government has 
been able to dominate the interpretation of the Self Rule Act in such a 
way that uranium has been desecuritized and declared by the Prime 
Minister as wholly within Nuuk’s jurisdiction. The Danish government 
seems to have accepted the unambiguous message of Jens-Erik 
Kirkegaard, Greenland’s minister of natural resources, who stated: “We 
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have taken over the sovereignty on matters of natural resources, so this is 
not a topic for Denmark to decide upon.”93  
5.3  Greenland as a Future Exporter of Rare Earths:  
A Meeting Place for China and the EU  
There is no difference between exporting shrimp or rare earths. 
Ove Karl Berthelsen, former minister of Industry and Mineral Resources, 201394 
On the 13th of June 2012, one day before the official visit of then 
Chinese President Hu Jintao in Copenhagen, a notable meeting took place 
in the offices of the Greenlandic government in Nuuk. Antonio Tajani, 
Vice President of the European Commission and the EU’s Commissioner 
for Industry, signed a memorandum of understanding with then Premier 
of Greenland, Kuupik Kleist, on the future cooperation between the two 
parties in the field of rare earths exploration.95 The timing of the meeting 
was hardly a coincidence, as Chinese investments in Greenland were 
expected to be high on Hu Jintao’s agenda when visiting Denmark the 
next day. Under these circumstances, the EU-Greenland rare earths 
memorandum should be interpreted as a signal from Europe that Beijing 
is not alone in showing interest for Greenland’s underground riches, nor 
to back this interest up with concrete investments. Given the monopolistic 
Chinese strategy on the production and exportation on rare earths, the 
agreement with Greenland represents a forceful political statement from 
the EU. 
The EU has expressed strong discontent with China’s absolute control of 
global rare earths supply and has accused China of restricting exports in 
order to increase prices, a dispute which was brought to the WTO in 
2012.96 The memorandum of understanding signed with Greenland is a 
signal from the EU that it will seek to bring an end to China’s monopoly 
on rare earths and secure its involvement in new areas of extraction, 
distinguishing Greenland as an attractive future partner in this sector. 
According to a memo from the European Commission, Greenland is 
estimated to hold about 9 per cent of the global rare earth deposits.97 
For Greenland, the rare earths agreement with the EU has reaffirmed the 
island’s image as a future resource base, and situated it as a future point 
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of convergence between the EU and China’s strategic interests. The 
commitment on the part of the EU to contribute 218 million euro over six 
years to geological mapping, competence building and the development 
of infrastructure around rare earths sites stands as an important indication 
of Greenland’s resource policy, which aims at diversifying investments in 
oil, gas and minerals, and attracting as much foreign capital as possible. 
On this point, the very idea of Greenland as the last resource frontier is 
tremendously important. As investment costs are high in a territory where 
no infrastructure exists outside the towns, and where the natural 
environment poses substantial challenges, the flow of investment to 
Greenland hinges on expectations of large returns. These returns can be 
in the form of sales profits, in the form of control over a crucial resource, 
or, preferable to both the EU and China on the rare earths market, a mix 
between economic profitability and the fulfilment of political motives.  
By showing interest in Greenland’s resource potential, and by sending a 
high-level Commissioner to meet with Kuupik Kleist in Nuuk, the EU is 
serving a similar purpose to Greenland’s statebuilding efforts as China. 
The EU has contributed to highlighting Greenland as an important future 
base for the extraction of rare earths, and put the Greenlandic government 
in a powerful position by representing one of the few alternatives to 
Chinese rare earths. The fact that both China and the EU are expressing 
an interest in Greenland’s rare earths, and are willing to back this interest 
up with high-level diplomatic visits and the signing of concrete 
agreements, is extremely valuable for Nuuk’s projection of itself as the 
authority over sought-after resources, and as the political centre for 
important negotiations.  
The rare earths memorandum of 2012 marks an important shift in 
Greenland’s relationship to the EU, and signals a new trajectory for 
Greenland’s strategic cooperation with Europe. The Greenland-EU 
relationship has long been dominated by a single controversial issue, 
namely the union’s ban on the import of seal skin, which has caused 
much resentment among Greenlanders.98 Moving beyond this long-
standing conflict, the Greenlandic government has now adopted a more 
pragmatic view of the EU, and has forged a relationship to the union 
which is characterized by Natalia Loukachava as a “political love 
affair.”99 If this relationship is backed up with concrete investments from 
the EU or its individual member states, Greenland may choose to focus 
more attention toward its European neighbourhood. If not, Nuuk will 
likely concentrate on more fruitful relations in the east, where, in addition 
to China, South Korea is emerging as a promising partner.  
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5.4 Greenland and South Korea: An Unforeseen Partnership 
As part of a strategy to expand Seoul’s international influence and create, 
in the words of former President Lee Myung-bak, a “Global Korea,” 
South Korea is directing more attention toward the Arctic, which has 
been expressed as a priority by the country’s new government.100 South 
Korea’s interests in the region are, as in China, linked to resources and 
the future possibilities for cost-saving shipping routes. South Korea has 
been eager to obtain a seat as a permanent observer at the Arctic Council, 
and its bid was approved together with China’s at the organization’s 
meeting in Kiruna in May 2013. Prior to the meeting, Greenlandic 
Premier Kuupik Kleist had expressed strong support for the bid, an 
encouragement which was well received in Seoul.101  
The emerging relationship with South Korea adds to Greenland’s inde-
pendent crafting of economic and political ties to other states. When 
describing his recent trip to Seoul, Mininnguaq Kleist talks of Greenland 
as a country that is increasingly self-confident on the international arena. 
In Seoul, he describes, Danish officials were merely facilitators of the 
meeting, and did not otherwise speak or act on behalf of Greenland. 
Notably, Mininnguaq Kleist, Kaj Kleist and Ove Karl Berthelsen draw a 
similar picture of Greenland as taking advantage of Danish embassies 
abroad when it comes to making contacts and organizing visits, occasions 
where Nuuk’s politicians exclusively promote Greenlandic national 
interests. Through diplomatic visits, including those arranged by Danish 
embassies, Nuuk clearly sets out with an agenda to advance the inter-
national image of Greenland as an actor distinct from Denmark. The Self 
Rule Act has made possible the unique situation where a self-governed 
territory is given the political space to market itself as fundamentally 
distinct from the parent state, while at the same time using the state in 
areas where it has the superior capacity.102  
South Korea has emerged as an important partner for Greenland, and 
several official visits between the two governments have taken place. 
Most notably, South Korea’s President Lee Myung-bak visited Illulisat in 
2012. Here, Kuupik Kleist served as the official host of the meeting. 
Although the Danish Minister of Environment was present as the 
representative for the Danish government, Kleist left not doubt as to 
which were the two main parties at the meeting: “As South Korea has 
come to Greenland, this marks the start of a new relationship between our 
two countries.” Kleist further emphasized that the visit showed “the 
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importance of continuing our foreign policy to create alliances with states 
that can contribute to Greenland’s development.”103  
And as a capital-rich and resource-hungry state, South Korea may indeed 
prove to be a partner which will significantly contribute to Greenland’s 
economic self-sufficiency. When Kuupik Kleist visited Seoul in 2012, he 
was joined by the Australian-owned company Greenland Minerals and 
Energy Ltd. The capital behind this company’s planned rare earths and 
uranium mine in southern Greenland comes from a group of public and 
private South Korean investors, including the industrial giant Hyundai. 
This investor group is currently involved in developing the mining 
project in Kvanefjeld, which is estimated to hold one of the world’s 
largest quantities of several rare earths.104 Greenland Minerals and 
Energy has called Greenland “the world’s last resource frontier” and 
stated that with time Greenland could surpass China as the largest global 
exporter of uranium.105 If the project at Kvanefjeld is carried out, 
investment from South Korea will play a major role as a facilitator of 
Greenland’s economic, and eventually political, independence. 
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6 Conclusions 
This report has argued that Nuuk’s projection of sovereignty through its 
resource diplomacy forms a crucial part of the territory’s statebuilding 
efforts. The report has demonstrated how Nuuk’s full jurisdiction over 
Greenland’s natural resources has allowed the territory to move further 
toward independence from Denmark, and to strengthen its autonomy on 
the international stage. By attracting foreign capital to its resource 
industries, and at the same time building up independent ties to foreign 
governments, Greenland is gradually establishing itself as a sovereign 
actor in the Arctic. By holding absolute authority over Greenland’s oil, 
minerals and rare earths, the government in Nuuk has become the 
primary negotiating partner for any foreign government or multinational 
company interested in the territory’s underground riches.  
This report has illustrated how Nuuk is using the heightened international 
attention toward the Arctic to build international recognition of its 
sovereignty through its resource policy and diplomatic practice, 
signalling with every political move that the Greenlandic government has 
taken over Copenhagen’s role as the highest authority on all issues 
pertinent to Greenland. When forging independent relations to China, 
South Korea and the EU, Greenland’s government is cleverly creating an 
image of itself as holding the principle authority over the Danish Realm’s 
Arctic affairs. Drawing on the theoretical work of Weber, Biersteker, 
Krasner and others, this external recognition is at the heart of establishing 
Greenland’s sovereignty.  
The projections for Greenlandic statehood within the next few decades 
remain uncertain – and highly controversial. But as the Arctic region is 
becoming a geopolitical hot-spot, Greenland’s ambitions of statehood are 
certainly becoming more realistic, and of much higher importance to 
regional, and indeed global, international relations. In a region where 
powerful global players are increasing their presence, Greenland no 
longer finds itself on the world’s political periphery.  
If profitable large-scale resource extraction does become reality, a 
Greenlandic state will likely materialize as the economic dependence on 
Denmark comes to an end. As a state, Greenland would possess some 
truly unique characteristics. Kalaallit Nunaat, which is the country’s 
name in Greenlandic and means Land of the People, would be the world’s 
twelfth largest state, inhabited by a mere 56,000 people. It would be the 
only state in the world with more than 80 per cent of its landmass 
permanently covered by ice, and the only state where no two towns are 
connected by road.  
Until the point when statehood becomes economically feasible, 
Greenland will follow the prescription provided by Canadian Prime 
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Minister Stephen Harper when he stated what he considered as the first 
principle of Arctic sovereignty: “Use it, or lose it.”106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
106 From Stephen Harper’s speech in Resolute, Canada, August 10, 2007. Quoted in BBC 
News: Canada to Strengthen Arctic Claim. August 10, 2007. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6941426.stm> 
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